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PRACTICAL EQUALITY AND THE LIMITS
OF SECOND BEST STRATEGIES FOR
JUSTICE
PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A
DIVIDED NATION. By Robert L. Tsai.1 W. W. Norton &
Company, 2019. Pp. 276. $27.95 (Cloth).
Franita Tolson2
In Practical Equality: Forging Justice in a Divided Nation,
Professor Robert Tsai argues that doing the hard work of equality
sometimes requires the use of doctrines that are not expressly
equality-based but can achieve the same goals as equality
doctrine. These “second-order” doctrines, which include fair play,
reasonableness, anti-cruelty, and free speech, are vehicles through
which equality can be vindicated without triggering the
controversy that often walks hand in hand with the quest for equal
treatment. Even for those of us who believe in making overt
demands for equality, we do not always agree on the proper
means of achieving these goals. Moreover, these demands can
complicate the struggle to protect equality norms when they are
under assault, as they are now; second order doctrines are
important alternatives when the goal is to preserve gains as
opposed to breaking down existing barriers. Professor Tsai’s book
is not only important, but it lays out a much-needed path forward
for achieving equality in challenging times. For all of its attributes,
however, the book also raises important questions about the
circumstances in which the demand for equality must be overt,
express, and uncompromising. While second-order doctrines are
an important part of any strategy seeking to create a more just
society, it is vital that they do not replace first-order calls for
equality and justice. Equality must be both practical and radical.
1. Professor of Law, American University.
2. Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Faculty and Academic Affairs, University of
Southern California Gould School of Law. Thanks to Emily Kong for research assistance.
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PART I: EQUALITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY?
There are many wonderful themes and concepts in Practical
Equality around which even those with diametrically opposed
views of equality can coalesce. The book does an excellent job of
tying equality to broader notions of dignity and fairness
underlying the second-order doctrines that it advocates,
illustrating that its themes are not about progressive ideals but
universal ones. Liberal organizations like the NAACP get similar
treatment in the book as the conservative Lambs Chapel, showing
how reliance on doctrines other than equality can transcend the
differences that tend to prevent agreement about what equal
treatment requires (p. 195). For this reason, the use of secondorder doctrines to achieve the goals of equality is attractive—it
avoids antagonizing opponents, seeking to find common ground
where none existed before, and it does so all in the name of justice.
For example, the doctrine of fair play resolved difficult cases
when courts were reluctant to commit to a broad reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment in most contexts. In criminal justice
cases, in particular, fair play has served to deliver justice to
African-Americans accused of heinous crimes who confess only
because of ill treatment at the hands of the police. While the
equality implications of these cases might be clear to those who
are committed to its terms, even courts unsympathetic to the
plight of African-Americans in that space were forced to confront
the fundamental injustice of coerced confessions (pp. 51-60).
Because fair play is, according to Professor Tsai, based on “widely
shared intuitions about how crucial decisions should be made,” it
is, in some ways, more attractive than resolving cases by defining
the scope of equal protection(pp. 67-68).3 Instead, it is far easier
to determine what fair play prohibits. Wider reliance on notions
of fair play could have special resonance in the death penalty
context, where equality arguments have explicitly failed (pp. 8092). As Professor Tsai argues, statistics show that people are less
in favor of criminal justice reform where they associate the
criminal justice system with blackness, even while conceding that
the challenged policy is cruel (pp. 80-92).4 Being aggressive in
3. Tsai notes that, with fair play, “[w]e don’t have to decide up front what kind of
autonomy is involved or what its full scope should be in this context. We don’t even have
to agree about every single element that would make something truly fair and equitable,
as if we were designing an ideal process from scratch.”
4. See also pp. 148–49, discussing Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s striking
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policing cruelty through fair play (and also through anti-cruelty
doctrine) can do some of the work that equality doctrine would
otherwise be tasked with in this context.
Similarly, the rule of reasonableness is also attractive as an
equality substitute. The rule is familiar, easy to implement, and it
is a fundamental part of equality doctrine. The Equal Protection
Clause, and its requirement of rationality, is simply another way
of requiring the government to act reasonably. When the
government departs from this baseline of reasonableness, which
often occurs in the context of laws that favor discrete and insular
minorities, the rule of reasonableness can fill the gap left by courts
reluctant to explicitly evoke the Equal Protection Clause’s
protected-class jurisprudence. The Supreme Court’s desire to
categorize historically oppressed groups to determine scrutiny
levels has not satisfactorily resolved the status of groups that have
been oppressed but don’t fit into neat categories—the mentally
disabled,5 the LGTBQ community,6 the politically unpopular,7 to
name a few. The Court’s protected-class jurisprudence has not
comfortably evolved to reflect the realities of our society, in which
the historical experiences of groups are more likely to be accepted
on their own merits rather than validated by the discriminatory
experiences of others. For example, LGTBQ+ individuals have
been persecuted, but the validity of their complaints should not
depend on how their experiences compare to the experiences of
groups to whom the Court does accord protection.
The court’s protected class jurisprudence invites the use of
the second-order doctrines that Professor Tsai champions in his
book. Reasonableness does not require the Court to determine
which groups are most oppressed and therefore worthy of the
highest level of scrutiny, in essence a very unattractive method of
comparing suffering. It is therefore acceptable to tell the City of
Cleburne that it was unreasonable for the City to internalize the
prejudices of its residents in refusing to give a permit to a home
designed for the mentally disabled because the outcome would be
the same if the mentally disabled was treated as a constitutionally

down the death penalty, and noting that “reducing merciless treatment across the board
can redound to the benefit of those who tend to feel the brunt of harsh policies.”
5. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
6. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
7. United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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protected group entitled to strict scrutiny under the Court’s
caselaw. Similarly, it is unreasonable for the government to deny
food stamps to hippies because legislators disapproved of their
lifestyle. The rule of reasonableness does not require the plaintiffs
to prove ill will, or that the mentally disabled and hippies are
similarly situated to the groups (like African-Americans or
women) that get special solicitude from the Court. The plaintiffs
only have to show that the government was not acting for sound
reasons (p. 111).
Professor Tsai’s book persuasively shows that second-order
doctrines can work in place of equality arguments. In thinking
about the use of second-order doctrines, however, it is important
to be clear about when these doctrines are adequate replacements
and when they are less-preferred alternatives. For example, the
Supreme Court has weaponized the First Amendment in cases
like Citizens United v. F.E.C. in order to promote an absolutism
divorced from the uses that the Warren Court employed to
protect discrete and insular minorities.8 Under this view of the
First Amendment, corporations and unions can spend in
unlimited quantities, drowning out the voices of those who do not
have equivalent resources. Relatedly, this interpretation of the
First Amendment also protects a baker from having to make a
cake for a gay couple for religious reasons, another implicit limit
on the ability of second-order doctrines to do the work of equality
when there are competing claims.9 For the Warren Court, the First
Amendment was a useful vehicle for eradicating inequality faced
by African-Americans during the Civil Rights era. The doctrine
protected the associational rights of groups like the NAACP from
crippling state legislation that would have forced them to cease
operations in the state. Much of the utility of second-order
doctrines depends on the Court that is employing them. For the
Warren Court, the First Amendment was a paradigmatic example
of what practical equality can achieve; for the Roberts Court, the
First Amendment is a vehicle for preventing equality from
becoming oppression, but at the expense of the most vulnerable
members of society.
There are similar limits to a rule of reasonableness as an
equality substitute. On one hand, the Japanese internment was a

8. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (F.E.C.), 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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clear example of government unreasonableness, because of its
willingness to engage in racist behavior based on flimsy (and some
might say nonexistent) evidence of disloyalty. While the rule of
reasonableness might have been the vehicle that ultimately led to
the Court to demand the release of a Japanese-American woman
in Ex Parte Endo, its blanket endorsement of Japanese
interenment in United States v. Korematsu illustrated how secondbest doctrines are just that—second best.10 The Japanese
internment was less an instance of government unreasonableness,
and more a situation in which the racism should have been directly
called out in a way that could have led to more political
accountability. As Endo shows, second-best solutions might not
be ideal when they force individual victims to bear the burden of
challenging a program that the government should have to defend
in the first instance. Instead of forcing the government to come
forward with compelling evidence to justify its blanket internment
program in Korematsu, the Court ordered the release of one
individual based on a lack of evidence of disloyalty. The
government might have lost the battle in Endo, but with
Korematsu, they won the war.
Second-order doctrines can vindicate the interest of
historically oppressed groups, but they can also contribute to their
continued oppression. In some ways, the success of these
doctrines is determined in no small part by the Court’s willingness
to deploy them in a way that achieves the equality ideal, bringing
us back to an area of contestation Professor Tsai hoped that the
use of these doctrines would avoid. As the next section shows,
there are also costs to second-order doctrines that have broader
cultural consequences, and this should factor into any strategic
decisions to deploy such doctrines as meaningful equality
substitutes.
PART II: THE COST OF SECOND-BEST STRATEGIES
Ex Parte Endo and Korematsu squarely present the question
of when equality advocates should force courts to confront
inequality head on, particularly when evasion can further the
oppression of discrete and insular minority groups. The voting
rights context is one area in which our reluctance to call out
10. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944).
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discrimination by name has had far reaching cultural
consequences, and second-order doctrines have proved
detrimental. For example, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
allows plaintiffs to prevail if they can show that any device used
for voting has the effect of abridging the right to vote on the basis
of race, neatly sidestepping any intent requirement. In the
decades since the Act was amended to allow plaintiffs to prevail
by showing effect alone, it has become one of the most potent
tools in the arsenal of civil rights advocates. Similarly, Sections
4(b) and 5 of the Act required that certain covered jurisdictions
preclear all changes to their voting laws with the federal
government before those changes could go into effect. The
Department of Justice would block the implementation of any law
that it found to be discriminatory in intent or effect. Again,
reliance on discriminatory effect made it much easier to block
laws than if the Department had to establish the existence of
discriminatory intent alone.
While litigation under Section 2 and preclearance under
Sections 4(b) and 5 were not without their challenges,11 the
effects-only regime has had negative impacts, which voting rights
advocates did not have to directly confront until the Shelby
County v. Holder case.12 In Shelby County, the Court invalidated
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, on the grounds that the
coverage formula was based on racially discriminatory practices,
such as literacy tests and poll taxes, which did not reflect the
current racial climate of the country.13 The Court touted the
progress in African-American voter registration and turnout that
has been achieved in the years since the Voting Rights Act
became law, which illustrated, as one scholar eloquently put it,
that “Bull Connor is dead.”14
The Supreme Court created the post-racial narrative in
Shelby County, because the reluctance in recent years to call out
intentional discrimination, facilitated by the fact that the law
required no showing of intent, gave them cover to claim that
11. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (stating that Section 2 did not
protect districts that were less than fifty percent majority-minority); Reno v. Bossier
Parish, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (holding that the government had to preclear a redistricting
plan enacted with discriminatory, but nonretrogressive, purpose).
12. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
13. Id. at 555.
14. Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of
the Voting Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 179 (2005).
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racism no longer existed. NAMUDNO v. Holder presented this
dynamic in stark fashion. In NAMUDNO, the Court intimated at
length that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was
unconstitutional, but application of the constitutional avoidance
canon would give Congress an opportunity to fix the statute.
Here, the second-order doctrine was the constitutional avoidance
canon, and equality advocates were more than happy to fall in line
behind this use of the doctrine, so long as the preclearance regime
survived to live another day. Yet, when the Court invalidated the
coverage formula of Section 4(b) four years later, in Shelby v.
Holder, the Court made it difficult to envision that any type of
remedy would have been appropriate, especially since much of its
opinion was based on a post-racialism which suggested that the
Act was outdated because of its federalism costs.15 Congress, even
if it had been functional enough to amend Sections 4(b) and 5
during the period between NAMUDNO and Shelby, was likely in
a lose-lose situation, given the chasm between the Court’s
deference to Congress in 200916 and the Court’s 2013 intervention
to save “Our Federalism” from a threat that no longer existed.17
15. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 540, 547 (arguing that the preclearance regime, as then
constituted, was no longer warranted because “blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal
decrees are rare,” “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels,” and the “tests
and devices that blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40
years”); but see id. at 565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses, and received a number of
investigative reports and other written documentation of continuing discrimination in
covered jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled filled more than
15,000 pages. The compilation presents countless ‘examples of flagrant racial
discrimination’ since the last reauthorization; Congress also brought to light systematic
evidence that ‘intentional racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and
widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still needed.’”).
16. Compare Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One (NAMUDNO) v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009), with Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 556. In Shelby County, the
Court did not resolve the question of what standard of review applies to Congress’s
exercises of authority under the Fifteenth Amendment, making it difficult for Congress to
legislate in this area moving forward. See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 542 n.1 (stating that
“Northwest Austin guides our review under both Amendments in this case”); but see
NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 204 (“The parties do not agree on the standard to apply in
deciding whether, in light of the foregoing concerns, Congress exceeded its Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power in extending the preclearance requirements . . . . That
question has been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve it. The Act’s
preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions
under either test.”).
17. See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement,
89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 393 (2015) (“The Shelby County decision suggests that the Court is
gravitating away from a broad interpretation of Congress’s enforcement authority that
would allow it to regulate otherwise constitutional conduct in order to
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In 2009, it was not advantageous to call out the Court for its failure
to speak in terms of equality, for its refusal to recognize that
discrimination not only existed but required continuing federal
oversight; instead, equality advocates took the crumb that was
handed to them and lost the war four years later.
And the post-Shelby world continues to struggle with using
the language of equality in the voting rights context, relying on
arguments centered in federalism and faux outrage so as to ignore
that the past is not really past. In Veasey v. Abbott, for example, a
panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Texas’s
voter identification law as a violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, but the court relied on an effects analysis, in part,
because it was uncomfortable with finding that the state engaged
in intentional discrimination that violated the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.18 In rejecting the district court’s analysis
of the constitutional claim, in which the lower court determined
that the state had acted with discriminatory intent, the appeals
court parsed the evidence in a very formalistic manner, relying on
older instances of discrimination to validate the statutory claim
that the law had a discriminatory effect,19 while disregarding this
evidence with respect to whether the state had violated the
Constitution.20
Both the Fifth Circuit panel and the en banc Fifth Circuit that
later reviewed the case also shied away from relying on an
intentional discrimination framework, finding that, while there
was enough evidence to support a finding of invidious purpose,
the case should be remanded . . . to determine whether there
should be a finding of invidious purpose.21 Although the Fifth
deter constitutional violations.”); see also Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The
Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1392–93
(2015) (arguing that proposed fixes to the VRA then under discussion “will simply increase
the risk that the current Court majority further dismantles—and hastens the demise of—
the remaining provisions of the Act” because “the Court no longer believes that
intentional racial discrimination by state actors remains the dominant problem of
democratic politics.”).
18. Cf. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing the
difficulty of establishing discriminatory intent on the part of an entire legislative body).
19. See id. at 504–05, 509–11.
20. See id. at 500.
21. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 241 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“In sum, although
some of the evidence on which the district court relied was infirm, there remains evidence
to support a finding that the cloak of ballot integrity could be hiding a more invidious
purpose . . . . [S]ince there is more than one way to decide this case, and the right court to
make those findings is the district court, we must remand . . . .”).
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Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the original panel that some
of the intent evidence was infirm,22 the en banc majority conceded
that there was evidence of intent on the part of the Texas
Legislature that fell squarely within the intentional discrimination
paradigm outlined in the Supreme Court decision of Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
This evidence included departures from normal procedures;
questionable statements and omissions from legislators who
supported the bill; the tenuousness of the legislature’s stated
purpose for passing the bill; and contemporary examples of statesponsored discrimination.23
The court was much more comfortable with assessing the
Section 2 violation, with the statute functioning as a second-order
doctrine in this context, much like the doctrines discussed in
Professor Tsai’s book. Section 2 may relieve plaintiffs of the
obligation to prove discriminatory intent, but its use has also
conditioned courts to question the very existence of
discriminatory intent, even in the face of substantial evidence of
intent.
In fact, the suggestion that the State of Texas might have
acted with discriminatory intent enraged the dissenters, who
accused the majority of engaging in “racial name calling,” merely
by remanding for a determination of whether the state acted with
invidious purpose. Additionally, the dissenters suggested that the
majority’s application of Section 2 rendered that statute
constitutionally suspect, because “a wide swath of racially neutral
election measures will be subject to challenge, a previously
unthinkable result under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Constitution’s federalist design.”24
While no one has to be labeled a racist in order for
discriminatory purpose to be present,25 there are more significant
22. Id. at 230–31, 241.
23. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 698-702 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g granted, 815
F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 2016) (mem.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 830 F.3d 216
(5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–68 (1977).
24. Veasy, 830 F.3d at 317 (opinion of Clement).
25. Id. at 335 (opinion of Costa). As Judge Costa observed:
Reluctance to hold that a legislature passed a law with a discriminatory purpose
is understandable. Yet . . . [i]t is also important to note that affirming the finding
of discriminatory purpose would not be the inflammatory “racial name-calling”
that Judge Jones’s dissent suggests. Such a finding, although one of grave
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concerns that inure from avoiding an intentional discrimination
finding than maintaining politeness. Notably, the remedies
available to plaintiffs can be significantly hampered by a refusal
to call out discrimination by name. Had the initial Fifth Circuit
panel found that Texas engaged in intentional discrimination,26
the court could have bailed the jurisdiction back into preclearance
under Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act.27
Eventually, the case worked its way back down and then up
to the Fifth Circuit again, before a new panel that would reject
arguments that the voter identification law violated either Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution.28 Thus, refusing to
confront the question of intentional discrimination ultimately had
a catastrophic effect. Invalidation of the law and forcing Texas
back into preclearance under Section 3 of the VRA was the more
appropriate—and just—remedy given the intent evidence before
the court. The decision of the original panel and the en banc court
to punt on the question of discriminatory intent led, first, to a
“softening” of the Texas voter identification law, in which an
affidavit option was added to the list of acceptable identification
and, later, a complete rejection of any statutory and constitutional
claims by a more hostile panel.29
The Veasey case is a manifestation of the failure to explicitly
call out breaches of equality and its unforeseen consequences.
importance, is not tantamount to a finding that the law had a “racist motivation.”
As Judge Kozinski explained in a decision upholding a district court
determination that a discriminatory purpose motivated a Los Angeles county
reapportionment plan, nothing in an opinion finding discriminatory purpose
needs to even “suggest[ ]” that lawmakers “harbored any ethnic or racial
animus.” Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., concurring). The discriminatory purpose can instead be the product
of “elected officials engag[ing] in the single-minded pursuit of incumbency.” That
most basic of human instincts—self-preservation—can thus provide an
explanation for enacting a law at least in part because it will have a disparate
impact on protected groups that favor the out-of-power party. Indeed, the highly
polarized nature of voting in Texas along racial lines (according to exit polls from
the last gubernatorial election, 72% of whites, 44% percent of Latinos, and 7%
of African-Americans voted for the Republican winner) makes depressing
minority turnout a strong proxy for suppressing Democratic turnout.
26. The court remanded because there was circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent. See Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493 (2015), reh’g granted, 815
F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 2016) (mem.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 830 F.3d 216
(5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
27. Section 3 of the VRA allows a judge, upon a finding of discriminatory intent, to
bail a jurisdiction back into the preclearance regime. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c).
28. Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2018).
29. See Veasy, 796 F.3d, note 22, at 519–20.
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The culture of not calling out discrimination by name has
empowered courts to treat any call for equality as a request for an
extraordinary remedy, an unfortunate development which was
front and center in the recent case of Abbott v. Perez. At issue in
Abbott was whether the Texas state legislature acted with
discriminatory intent when it enacted redistricting plans that
allegedly diluted the votes of minorities. The legislature—
ironically the same legislature that enacted the voter
identification law at issue in Veasey v. Abbott— originally adopted
redistricting plans in 2011 that never went into effect, but were
found by a three judge panel to have been adopted with racially
discriminatory intent.30 In 2013, Texas repealed the 2011 plans and
replaced interim, court-drawn plans with new plans that were also
challenged as discriminatory in intent and effect on constitutional
and statutory grounds.31 The lower court invalidated the 2013
plans, holding that the state legislature had failed to purge the
discriminatory taint of the original 2011 plans when it adopted the
2013 version. The Supreme Court, in finding that the legislature’s
intent in 2011 was irrelevant to the 2013 plans, held that the lower
court erroneously disregarded the presumption that the
legislature acted in good faith, a presumption that is “not changed
by a finding of past discrimination.”32 Instead, a court “‘must be
sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a
legislature’s redistricting calculus.’ And the ‘good faith of [the]
state legislature must be presumed.’”33
Abbott v. Perez stands for the uncomfortable proposition
that, despite evidence that two lower courts in two different
circuits in two different cases found to be indicative of
discriminatory intent, courts should assume that the state
legislature acted in good faith even in the face of claims of
discriminatory intent. In this way, Abbott is consistent with the
post-racialism of Shelby County, which viewed liability under a
discriminatory effects framework, which does not require any
evidence of intent, as tantamount to calling otherwise good
people racists. The discriminatory effects approach of Section 2 of
the VRA had long sustained civil rights advocates challenging
state voting laws, but these cases signal the true danger that
30.
31.
32.
33.

Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2316 (2018).
Id. at 2317.
Id. at 2324.
Id.
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statute faces in the coming years. When we fail to speak in the
language of equality—directly, clearly, and without
compromise—we empower its opponents to craft the narrative,
no matter how erroneous and harmful, about what equality
should look like, and we endanger the victories achieved through
second-order doctrines.
CONCLUSION: BE PRACTICAL AND CALL OUT
DISCRIMINATION BY NAME
Practical Equality illustrates the obvious benefits of secondorder doctrines, and persuasively shows the value in achieving
equality through other means. Professor Tsai recognizes that
there is a time and place for the public condemnation that comes
with identifying injustice, and he has given equality advocates
much to think about with respect to the strategies that they pursue
to achieve a more egalitarian society. But, as the Voting Rights
Act illustrates, there has been a cost to the refusal to call out
discrimination by name (p. 18). Voting rights is one area in which
an intentional discrimination finding could have achieved more
for equality than second-order doctrines that have been, until
recently, useful for constraining state action. Sometimes the
stigma and backlash are a small price to pay for demanding
explicit adherence to basic equality norms, even if, to use
Professor Tsai’s words, “our tone is necessarily judgmental” (p.
18). Second-order doctrines must be a part of any litigation
strategy seeking to enforce equality, but let us not silence our
demands for equality because our silence could hasten, rather
than prevent, the very future that we are trying to avoid.

